2005: Vestibular Neuritis (DL, missed 37 days)
2005: upper back strain (DL, missed 36 days)
2006: right shoulder strain (DL, missed 23 days)
2006: right shoulder tendinitis (DL, missed 82 days)
2007: right middle finger injury (DL, missed 45 days)
Happy New Years and hope everyone had a great NYE to ring in the new decade. While nursing this hangover I've decided on my resolutions for the New Year, eat better, spend more time in the library, go to the gym when possible and provide you fine readers with as much high quality analysis I can provide while keeping a reasonable GPA. Here's to hoping I can keep that (at least until finals), cheers.
In part one of my take on the Angels off-season moves we dealt with the loss of Chone Figgins and the addition of Hideki Matsui, and here we are looking at the addition of Fernando Rodney and the loss of John Lackey respectively. Again, the addition of Rodney is not exactly a replacement for Lackey, but as the Angels payroll stands at 113million, almost exactly what it was last year, it seems that Fernando is the only pitcher that will be brought in to fill the void with the loss of John Lackey and what a void it is. As I noted earlier, Lackey has been the de facto ace of the Angels for the last few years and has proven himself to be a valuable and reliable starter, averaging a career 117ERA+ and 219 innings and pitching big games in big spots for the Angels since the 2002 World Series. To be sure, while Lackey’s numbers may not scream “Ace” he has clearly shown himself to be a valuable and an above average starter in the American League in the prime of his career. And yet in the face of losing such a valuable starter what has Anaheim done? Not a thing, well nothing in the starting rotation at least. Instead, the Angels have signed the former Tigers closer to a two year 11million deal, and it seems unclear as to whether it was worth the money.
In his first year s fulltime closer, Fernando Rodney had a season that was deceptively mediocre. On the surface, one could argue Rodney had a breakthrough season for the Tigers in his age 32 season, accumulating 37 saves while only having only blown one opportunity. To be completely literal, Rodney did everything you could ask a closer to do, that being have gone into practically every opportunity to save a game and accomplished just that, but is that really the best indicator of Rodney’s true talent? I for one would argue no, as the rest of his numbers indicate that Rodney is a guy who is more lucky than good. For sure, for a guy who supposedly lives on his electric stuff Rodney’s strikeout numbers took a serious dive the last year, going from an impressive 10.9 strikeouts per nine innings to a pretty pedestrian 7.1. This is most likely the product of a decreased rate of swinging strikes by opposing batters for Rodney, once averaging 11-12% for his career fell to only 9% last season. Such a drop may not seem that big of a deal, but if the subsequent strikeout rate drop are any indication Fernando will have a more difficult time getting betters out.
As if it’s not bad enough that Rodney is striking out less batters, Fernando is similarly walking batters like it’s going out of style. Indeed, never a guy who exhibited great control, Rodney continued his wild ways walking a pretty horrible 4.9 batters per nine innings, as a reliever! Especially when you’re dealing with high leverage situations like the ones closers live and die in, walks can be a pitcher’s undoing, and someone who walks nearly five per nine innings is flirting with disaster with every pitch. Admittedly this is a significant improvement from last year when he had an embarrassing 6.7walks per nine, a career rate of 4.6 suggests that this is not some sort of statistical aberration; the guy just can’t throw strikes.
Add up terrible peripherals like the ones exhibited here by Rodney and you have exactly what you’d think, a pretty lousy pitcher. With an unimpressive 4.40 ERA and 104ERA+ respectively, Rodney has been average at best and shitty at worst. Why is this guy worth 11 million again?
In sum, combined with the signing of Hideki Matsui the Angels in my opinion have made a half-assed attempt at improving their team, replacing valuable assets with marginally valuable ones on the cheap. I think Tony Regins got lucky last year, gambling on Kendry Morales to give him similar production to that of Mark Teixera and getting away it, but such gambles cannot and will not work out this time. Instead of recognizing the immensity of their losses, the Angels seem to be taking their competition for granted and assuming that they have enough talent within to let every high priced free agent walk away without even trying to retain them. Maybe it will work out and maybe they will still manage to squeak by into the AL West division championship, but as the Mariners improve and the Talented Young Texas Rangers have another year of experience under their belts, one can only wonder if the Angels’ gambles will ultimately proof foolish.
Now I don't pretend to know the intimate details of the Angels’ organization and talent. After all, the Anaheim Angels since winning the 2002 World Series title have been one of the more successful and productive teams in all of baseball, winning five division titles this decade built on Mike Scioscia's aggressive brand of baseball based on pitching, defense and pushing the action as much as possible. To be sure, the guys running the Angels seem to know what they’re doing, probably a lot more than I do. And the Angels have been quite deft at making adjustments when they lose key players, last year losing Mark Teixera to the Yankees only to somehow manage to be as good if not better this year, demolishing the much-hated Red Sox in four games; their talent for adaption is quite clear. Having said all of this, and considered there is a possible method to the Angels’ madness that I don’t see, I find it very unlikely that their recent moves will be regarded as smart. Indeed, for those who haven’t kept up, there has been a lot of turnover on the Angels’ roster, first losing their dynamic third basemen Chone Figgins to the division rival Mariners, and then losing their best pitcher, John Lackey to the Boston Red Sox. For certain, these two players were some of the more talented and indeed valuable to the success of Angels’ baseball, so how do they respond? First by signing the 36 year old Hideki Matsui, a DH with two bad knees and Fernando Rodney, the Tigers closer with 37 saves, but 4.40 ERA, this is how they respond? While still a talented team, the Anaheim Angels seem to have taken a serious step backwards and put their ability to defend the AL West Title in serious doubt.
In regard to the designated hitter spot, the Angels have been somewhat lacking in production these days thanks to the decline of Vladimir Guerrero. Once one of the games’ most feared hitters, age and injuries have slowed Vlad’s bat speed and in turn seriously hurt his productivity. Limited to only 100 games last year, Vlad still hit .295, but had a meager OBP of .334 and slugged only .460 with 15 home runs. Not terrible numbers, but for a DH a OPS+ 104 (100 being league average) is simply unacceptable for a team that hopes to contend for a World Series Title. Consequently, the Angels managed to lure the World Series MVP away from the Yankees for a measly $6.5million for a pretty significant upgrade. Last year batting .274/.367/.509 with 28 home runs, Hideki at the age of 35 had one of his best seasons to date, providing clutch hitting and protection for the other big hitters in the Yankee lineup, but there are serious questions whether Matsui can duplicate these numbers away from Yankee Stadium. Indeed, Hideki’s home and road splits through OPS+ are quite dramatic, hitting an impressive OPS+ 157 at the New Yankee Stadium, but hitting a pretty pedestrian 112 away from the short right porch of the Yankee’s New Digs. Further, as mentioned earlier, Hideki is going to be 36 at the beginning of the 2010 season and is not exactly the picture of perfect health. With two knees that have to be drained throughout the season, Matsui’s days of playing the field are long over, thus significantly reducing his usefulness. Matsui is not a bad player by any stretch, and in truth he’s been one of my favorite Yankees since he came over in 2003, but this is not exactly a slam dunk signing for Anaheim.
While Hideki’s value may be slightly better than Vlad’s, what is more pressing is the issue of the loss of Figgins and how that impacts the Angel’s offensive attack. In truth it may seem unfair to compare Matsui’s value to Figgins considering the comparative size and length of their contracts (Figgins got a five year deal to Matsui’s one) what is plain is that the signing has been the only significant move to bolster their offense since allowing Figgins to leave. As such, we must compare the net gains and loss of talent for the team to adequately determine his value. Although not as powerful as Matsui, Chone provided Scioscia with a great deal of versatility with his all-around play. With the ability to play every position on the field except catcher and pitcher, Figgins’ provides above average defense anywhere he plays. In addition, Figgins exhibits an exceptional eye at the plate, walking 101 times last year, giving him a .395OBP further increasing his value, and when he’s on base he’s productive, stealing 42 bases and only getting caught 17 times. To be sure, while not without his flaws, Chone Figgins is a player with considerable tools and his loss will is a significant one; the question remains, how will the Angels be able to replace those tools, if at all? From what I can see Matsui, while a nice signing is not enough to make up for the loss of both Guerrero and Figgins and it would be foolish to think so. Perhaps Angels GM Tony Regins is confident that prospect Brandon Wood or Howie Kendrick can make up for the loss, but neither has the track record or shown an ability to stay healthy or hit at a major league level. Wood in particular, once a highly touted prospect, has shown a lack of knowledge of the strike zone at the major league level, posting a .192/.222/.313 line, striking out 74 in 230 ABs. A small sample size for sure, and he’s only 25, but the results so far don’t give the Angels much hope that Brandon can even come close to Figgins’ productivity.
In the next section I’ll cover Fernando Rodney and the loss of John Lackey, but at least here it seems the Angels offense will not be nearly as potent as it was last season. While replacing Vladimir with a more productive player, the loss of Chone cannot be understated and will be severely felt in all facets of his game. Figgins may not be the only productive player in Anaheim, but expecting to replace his value on a hope and a prayer is unrealistic. While the other players in the Angels system may turn out to be good there’s no guarantee that it will happen and if it does winning the AL West won’t be so easy.
About me
My Blog List
-
-
OKC's Sam Presti is an overrated draft savant8 months ago
-
-
A Goodbye and a Thank You5 years ago
-
-
Some Key Terms to Know When Reading
wOBA - a new one I'll be using, short for weighted on-base average is essentially an improvement on OPS. Scaled to average OBP (with .330 the league average) wOBA more properly weighs on-base percentage higher than slugging percentage and more accurately weighs extra base hits (a double isn't worth double of that of a single which is what SLG does) to give a better picture of a batter's worth.
.000/.000/.000 is the industry shorthand for the split stats for batting average, on base percentage, and slugging percentage, in that order, these are some of the more commonly used stats to indicate how productive a hitter is.
OPS - shorthand for On-Base Percentage Plus Slugging is becoming more in vogue in the mainstream media to get a better idea of the raw production of a hitter, instead of saying how often they get a hit OPS shows how productive those hits are.
BABIP - Batting Average on Balls in play, its pretty much what it says, how often that a batter puts in ball in play that it becomes a hit, its a stat that shows if a hitter is just having a lot of bad luck or a hot streak is just fluky. For instance a BABIP of .200 is considered unlucky its not that he's not hitting, he just isn't hitting where the fielders are not there.
OPS+ - as the name implies, OPS+ is OPS but with adjustments to park effects and other outliers to normalize the data. Indeed, as most people know some parks are harder to hit at than others, which this stat compensates for, 100 being the baseline of league average
ERA+ - similar to OPS+ its a more highly sophisticated way of evaluating a pitcher's performance adjusted for park effects, this also is on a numerical basis with 100 as league average.
FIP - short for fielding independent pitching, FIP measures the only aspects of the game that a pitcher has total control over, strikeouts, walks, and home runs. Scaled to ERA, FIP gives a truer indication of a pitcher's true talent by removing the luck apparent with balls in play.
WHIP - Walks and Hits per innings pitched, a little more well known stat, but a good indicator of how effective a pitcher is. Chances are if a guy is walking a lot of guys and giving up a hot of hits, he's not pitching all that well.
xFIP- a variation of FIP which normalizes home run rates as a way to discount aberrational home run rates that are either too high or too low to reasonably sustain.
UZR- Short of Ultimate Zone Rating, this is the number of runs above or below average a fielder is in both range runs and error runs combined. This is a difficult stat to understand because it's not one of those stats you can figure out at home, because it includes a bevy of factors including park effects and speed. As a consequence, its not a perfect stat, but its the best defensive stat we have. Also seen as UZR/150 is the Ultimate Zone rating per 150 games.
RngR - Range Runs is defined as the number of runs above or below average a fielder is, determined by how the fielder is able to get to balls hit in his vicinity. Also not a perfect fielding stat, but one of the many fielding stats that help as as fans get a fuller picture of a player's defensive prowess.
About Me
- burnsie77
- Morristown, NJ, United States
- I write and read everything I can about baseball and have some thoughts about it.
Blog Archive
-
▼
2010
(23)
-
▼
January
(10)
- Some Thoughts on Johnny Damon
- A's Take Big Risk with Sheets
- Small Market Reds Nab the Big Armed Cuban Chapman
- McGwire? Steroids? No Way.
- The Hall of Fame is Turning into the Hall of Seeme...
- Sox Sign Beltre
- Mets sign Guy They Never Should've Traded in the F...
- Happy New Years from New York Nine
- What is the Angels Plan Exactly? (Part Two)
- What is the Angels Plan Exactly? (Part One)
-
▼
January
(10)
Followers
Blog Archive
-
▼
2010
(23)
-
▼
January
(10)
- Some Thoughts on Johnny Damon
- A's Take Big Risk with Sheets
- Small Market Reds Nab the Big Armed Cuban Chapman
- McGwire? Steroids? No Way.
- The Hall of Fame is Turning into the Hall of Seeme...
- Sox Sign Beltre
- Mets sign Guy They Never Should've Traded in the F...
- Happy New Years from New York Nine
- What is the Angels Plan Exactly? (Part Two)
- What is the Angels Plan Exactly? (Part One)
-
▼
January
(10)